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Attempting to Ensure Fairness in the 
Glare of the Media 
RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN 
INTRODUCTION 
ALL LEGAL ~nTEMS worthy of credit have a commitment to achieving 
.fi fairness between the parties to the litigation. In addition, common law legal 
systems have a longstanding commitment to openness in judicial proceedings. 
At the same time, and in part for the same reasons, they also have a longstand-
ing commitment to freedom of expression. There is inevitably a tension among 
these three goals, because in cases of great public interest openness leads to pub-
licity, and publicity may threaten or at least appear to threaten the fairness of a 
trial. In addition, sometimes publicity may create an intrusion on the lives of 
jurors and witnesses. This is a well-trodden area, and I can only skim the sur-
face of it in this essay. I am going to offer an American perspective on this area 
- or at least the perspective of one American. 1 I am far from an uncritical advo-
cate of the way that we deal with these problems in the United States. At the 
same time, I am sufficiently inured in the American ideology of the area that 
some of the approaches in England (and, I believe, elsewhere throughout the 
United Kingdom) 2 strike me as unduly restrictive of freedom of expression. I am 
aware of this bias, and aware of the dangers of criticising a system with which 
one is not intimately familiar. Nevertheless, I will offer my own views, for what 
they are worth. 
Different considerations may apply to expression by participants in the legal 
system - notably parties, lawyers, witnesses, and jurors - on the one hand and 
by non-participants, mainly the media, on the other. I will focus for most of this 
paper on limitations on the media, and possible substitutes for such limitations. 
1 For the views of an American who generally prefers the English approach to these issues, see 
W. T. Pizzi, "Discovering Who We Are: An English Perspective on the Sunpson Trial" (1996) 67 
University of Colorado I.aw Review 1017. 
2 I will he focusing on the law of England and Wales; I gather that in most material respects the 
law in this area is roughly similar in Scotland and Northern Ireland - or at least more similar to the 
English law than to American law. 
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LIMITATIONS ON THE MEDIA AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
Restrictions on Reporting 
In the United States, a bedrock principle is that, with only theoretical limitations 
at the extreme margin, anything that the media learn about legal proceedings -
whether pending, imminent, prospective, or past- they may publicise. 3 I believe 
this is a valuable and important principle, and that the United Kingdom suffers 
in comparison by a less stringent attachment to it. 
In England, under the Contempt of Court Act 1981 the media arc expected to 
be self-restraining, under penalty of contempt, against reporting that might cre-
ate a substantial risk of seriously prejudicing active legal proceedings - pro-
ceedings being "active" once there has been an arrest or issuance of a warrant.4 
This limitation, it appears to me, can be a serious impingement on investigative 
reporting. For example, in one 1997 case, Attorney-General v. Morgan,5 a news-
paper was held in contempt under section 2(2) of the Act for breaking the story 
of a large counterfeit ring the day after the defendants were arrested - arrests 
that, it appears, would not have occurred had it not been for the reporting itself, 
which was tipped off to the police. The court emphasised that the story had been 
intended to make a big impact on the reader- but what would one expect?- and 
had portrayed the defendants as criminals. And how else could one portray 
them and yet tell this story? The Morgan decision may be erroneous under 
English law. It may even be a stray case. But neither can one say that in the 
English context it is a bizarre result. The courts tend to decide cases by examin-
ing all the material circumstances, a decision style that makes a wide range of 
results possible.6 Morgan represents the type of legal risk to which the media are 
consistently exposed. 
' Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See American Bar Association, 
Standards for Criminal Justice: Fair Trtal and Free l'ress, 3rd ed. (approved 1991, published 1992), 
Standard 8-3.1 ("Absent a clear and present danger to the fairness of a trial or other compelling 
interest, no rule of court or judicial order should be promulgated that prolubits representatives of 
the news media from broadcasting or publishing any information in their possession relating to a 
criminal case."). 
4 With respect to contemporaneous reports of proceedings held in public, s. 4(1) of the Act creates 
a defence to the strict liability rule if the reporting is "fair and accurate" and published in "good faith". 
This provision seems not to come into play much, though the courts certainly do refer to it often, for 
example, R v. Dover justices (1992) 156 J.P. 433; R v. Beck [1993] 2 All E.R. 177. From an American 
perspective, the provision is somewhat worrisome - raising the concern that 111 some circumstances 
whether a reporter will be punished will depend on whether or not the judiciary determines the report-
ing to be fair and accurate, published in good faith, and sufficiently contemporaneous. 
5 Also Attorney-General v. News Group, The Independent, 17 July 1997. 
6 See Attorney-General v. MGN Ltd [1997] 1 All E.R. 456 (emphasismg the importance of con-
sidering the likelihood of an article being read, the impact it would likely have at the time of publi-
cation, and the residual impact at the time of tnal; declining to hold publication contemptuous, 
because there had previously been saturation publicity concerning the defendant); Attorney-
Geneneral v. Independent News Ltd [1985] 2 All E.R. 370 (emphasising lapse of time before trial 
among other factors, includmg length of a broadcast and the limited circulation of a newspaper). 
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From an American perspective, a case of this sort seems most unfortunate. It 
is of profound importance that the media have the incentive to find wrongdoing 
of public importance and bring it to light; Morgan itself is one more demon-
stration of that principle. And it is unfortunate when the courts act as censors of 
the media, subjecting them to punishment depending on the merits of what they 
have said, how it was intended, and how it might be perceived. Such intrusion 
may sometimes be inevitable in libel cases - a field that is far more limited in the 
United States than in the United Kingdom, and arguably should be limited. But 
at least libel does not impose sanctions unless someone has been hurt by an inac-
curate report, and even then the sanction is usually compensatory rather than 
punitive or prohibitive. The English Contempt Act, by contrast, prohibits 
speech because of speculative fears of impact on the judicial system. And part of 
those fears, it appears to me, is fear not that trial will be rendered unfair -
because often, as I will explain shortly, the unfairness can be prevented - but 
that the system will be put to inconvenience in preventing unfairness. 
I have a somewhat similar, but more qualified, reaction to the use of the 
court's power, un~lcr section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act, to impose 
restrictions postponing when the media may report fully on proceedings that 
occur in open court.7 These restrictions are imposed rather frequently, and, 
while the appellate courts do not give the trial courts anything like a free hand in 
imposing such restrictions, they are still an important part of the English judicial 
scene. After spending some time in England, I have found that there is remark-
ably broad support across the political spectrum, even among many people gen-
erally devoted to civil liberties, for restrictions of this sort. I confess that I can 
now see some merit to the English approach. To the extent that reporting allows 
the public to respond to and affect the events being reported, that effect is gener-
ally undesirable in the context of criminal prosecutions. To the extent that 
reporting keeps the public informed, and allows long-term consideration of mat-
ters of public interest, that function can arguably be performed almost as well 
after a short delay, when the trial is over. Moreover, such restrictions do not 
involve the court in evaluating the merits of what the media reported. 
Nevertheless, on balance, I find such restrictions very troublesome. They cre-
ate an undesirable entanglement, by requiring the courts to police a line between 
what may and may not be reported. Perhaps more importantly, these restric-
tions are a form of censorship. They order the media not to report what they 
know. This is information that might be highly newsworthy, and will probably 
be less newsworthy even a few days later and that anybody in the world, by 
walking into open court - or, in some cases, logging onto the internet8 - could 
7 Section 8 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 also imposes strict limitations on what may he 
reported ahout co111mittal proceedmgs, absent consent of the accused. 
' Apparently infor111atio11 on the notorious Rosemary West case was availahlc 111 En!;land vu the 
Internet, from foreign media sources, even while the domestic media were foreclosed from report-
ing It. l11format1011, once released to any significant segment of the public anywhere in the world, 1s 
now like the tide, 1111poss1hlc to hold back or confine. 
96 Richard D. Friedman 
find out. They therefore seem to reflect a theoretical problem: if we genuinely 
mean the proceedings to be open, then should we not keep them genuinely open? 
I have argued against restrictions on reporting. But how in these cases - inves-
tigative reporting before trial and contemporaneous reporting of trial proceed-
ings themselves - can unfairness in litigation be prevented? The question needs 
to be considered with respect to, first, concern about future trials and, secondly, 
concern about the current trial. 
Preventing Unfairness: Concern about Future Trials 
With respect to prejudice in future trials - arising either because the trial has not 
yet begun or because trials related to and subsequent to the current one are 
anticipated - I think the main response should be not to over-magnify the prob-
lem. 9 I take this view despite the existence of a large body of research suggest-
ing the possibility of such prejudice. 10 Despite this research, it is hard to find any 
specific cases in recent years in which it can be said with any confidence that 
prejudicial pre-trial publicity led to a miscarriage of justice. 11 
As the court noted in Ex parte Telegraph, "the staying power and detail of 
publicity, even in cases of notoriety, are limited." 12 Usually the biggest floods of 
publicity about a crime occur shortly after it has been committed and after a sus-
pect has been arrested, and typically this occurs at least several months before 
trial. 13 And even if the pre-trial publicity does have some staying power, it is 
9 Arguably, the United States Supreme Court has carried the remedy of not over-magnifying the 
problem too far. See Mu'min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (holding, 5--4, that there was no con-
stitutional v10lation in trial judge's failure to question jurors specifically about the content of the 
news reports to which each had been exposed). 
10 These studies are ably summarised in C. A. Studebaker & S. D. Penrod, "Pretrial Publicity: 
The Media, the Law, and Common Sense" (1997) 3 Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 428. A some-
what older summary is D. Linz & S. Penrod, "Exploring the First and Sixth Amendments: Pretrial 
Publicity and Jury Decision Making", in D. S. Kagehiro and W. S. Laufer (eds.), Handbook of 
Psychology and Law (1992, New York: Springer-Verlag), 3. 
11 See S. Helle, "Publicity Does Not Equal Pre1udice" (1997) 85 Illinois Bar journal 16, 18-19 
(noting that because of "affirmative action" against prejudicial effects, the Supreme Court has not 
had to overturn a conviction because of pre-trial publicity in 30 years, and that in some notorious 
cases in which prejudice might have been anticipated the defendants were acquitted); Studebaker & 
Penrod, supra note 10, 455-456 (calling for further research that would "help determine whether 
pretrial publicity has resulted in bias in any particular, actual case."). 
12 [1993] 2 All E.R. 971,978; [1993] 1 W.L.R. 980,987. 
13 This factor distinguishes many of the experimental studies that suggest the prejudicial power 
of pre-trial publicity; in many of those studies, the prejudicial information is presented to the sub-
jects very shortly before the subjects consider the "trial" materials. See Studebaker & Penrod, supra 
note 10,446 ("neither the amount of publicity [in laboratory studies] nor the time period over which 
it is presented approaches the conditions of pretrial publicity exposure in the real world"). One 
study that did focus on the impact of delay concluded that "a fairly short, 12-day delay eliminated 
bias created by exposure to factually biasing publicity", G. P. Kramer et al., "Pretrial Publicity, 
Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias" (1990) 14 Law and Human Behavior 409,431. Emotional public-
ity- containing information likely to arouse negative emotions- appeared, however, to retain some 
prejudicial potential after this rather short delay. 
ABA Standard 8-3.3 calls for the court to consider granting a continuance or a change of venue 
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generally received casually by the jurors, before their attention is focused on the 
matter or they have vital responsibilities relating to it. 14 The evidence at trial 
will likely have far more impact on them - though some courts may have been 
overly optimistic in thinking that this evidence will crowd out whatever the 
jurors learned before. 15 Moreover, even if the jurors do remember, we can hope 
that they will disregard. Here again the courts have been optimistic, perhaps 
overly so. 16 The cause of the optimism may be the apparent lack of any alterna-
tive palatable choice. 17 
And yet, where pre-trial publicity does appear to pose significant danger, 
there are two other measures, used more commonly in the United States than in 
the United Kingdom, that can often mitigate or eliminate its prejudicial effects. 
One is extra care in jury selection. 18 Jury selection in the United Kingdom is usu-
ally a far briefer, more casual matter than in the United States, and that is prob-
ably a good thing. But in the occasional cases in which concern over pre-trial 
publicity is serious, taking extra time and examining each prospective juror 
closely are probably worthwhile measures. I believe our courts tend to overdo it 
in these cases. They forget that the constitutional requirement is not to find 
when there is a suhstantial probability of pre1udice from pre-trial publicity. Because of the length of 
the typical pre-trial delay, I do not believe a further continuance to await the ebbing of the effects of 
pre-trial publicity is usu,illy necessary. And if, after a substantial pre-trial delay, an intolerable 
degree of prejudicial potential remains, it will not usually be appropriate to delay the trial further; 
any further continuance that is likely to diminish that potential significantly is likely to be intolera-
bly long. 
14 I think this factor also distinguishes many of the experimental studies that suggest a powerful 
impact of pre-trial publicity. In many of these studies, the subjects are given prejudicial information 
about the defendant as part of the study. This factor seems highly likely to enhance the impact of 
that information, especially 111 light of the rather meagre case summaries or transcripts that are often 
used in these studies. See Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 10, 446 ("presentations of the pretrial 
publicity in expcnmental settings do not match the manner of self-selected consumption of pretrial 
publicity"). 
15 See, for example, R v. West (1996) 2 Cr. App. R. 374,386 (quoting R v. Kray (1969) 53 Cr. App. 
R. 412, 414-15: "The dr,una ... of a trial almost always has the effect of excluding from recollec-
tion that which went before."). 
16 See, for example, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (Kennedy J., dissenting) 
("Empirical research suggests that in the few instances when jurors have been exposed to extensive 
and prejudicial pre-trial publicity, they are able to disregard it and base their verdict upon the evi-
dence presented in court."); R v. Coughlan (1976) 63 Cr. App. R. 33, 37 ("Juries are capable of dis-
regarding that which is not properly before them. They are expected to disregard what one accused 
says about another 111 his absence. If they can do that, which is not easy, they can disregard what has 
been said in a newspaper."). Compare Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 10, 442-443 (reviewing 
mixed results of research on extent to which instructions to jurors reduce their reliance on pre-ma! 
publicity). 
17 See R v. West (1996) 2 Cr. App. R. 374,386 ("[T]here can scarcely ever have been a case more 
calculated to shock the public who were entitled to know the facts ... [And yet] a fair trial could be 
held after such intensive publicity adverse to the accused ... To hold otherwise would mean that 1f 
allegations of murder are sufficiently horrendous so as inevitably to shock the nation, the accused 
cannot be tried. That would be absurd."). Compare the presumption of innocence. It means little if 
the jury refuses to put aside the self-evident fact that the prosecutor has sufficient confidence in the 
defendant's guilt to press the charge. Do jurors truly put this fact out of mind? Perhaps not. But we 
do not decline on that ground to try defendants. 
18 See ABA Standard 8-3.5(a). 
98 Richard D. Friedman 
jurors who have not heard information about the case, but rather to find jurors 
who can sit fairly. As our Supreme Court said in Irvin v. Dowd, it "is sufficient 
if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on 
the evidence heard in court." 19 Of course, it is no easy matter to determine 
which jurors satisfy this standard,20 and there is a danger of discriminatory 
selection. Nevertheless, I believe the effort can often be effective. It can at least 
weed out those who are unprepared even to try to sit fairly, and it can distin-
guish among jurors based on the extent of the information they have received. 
And, where it is feasible, without an unduly long voir dire, to select a panel of 
qualified jurors who have not been exposed to a substantial amount of poten-
tially prejudicial information, the court may as well try to pick such a jury. 
Second, sometimes a change of venue eases the problem. I suspect this 
response is more useful in the United States than in the United Kingdom, where 
a higher percentage of stories of interest receive essentially the same coverage 
across the nation. Sometimes, though, just moving the trial away from the very 
epicentre of interest will diminish the problems created by pre-trial publicity. 
For example, the Oklahoma City bombing was a story of intense interest 
throughout the United States -and to a lesser extent throughout the world- and 
moving the trial to Denver did not mean that the pool of jurors would be igno-
rant of the case before entering the courtroom. But I suspect it did make for a 
somewhat easier time in selecting a jury and a somewhat more rational trial 
atmosphere. 
Of course, changes of venue can make their own problems, especially when 
the case is an ethnically charged one and the new venue has a markedly differ-
ent ethnic makeup from the scene of the crime. I have in mind particularly the 
first Rodney King beating trial, which was moved from central Los Angeles to a 
virtually all-white area. The change of venue probably accounted in significant 
part for the result in that case - acquittal of the officers on all charges except one 
count against one officer, on which the jury was hung - and the disastrous riots 
that followed. A particularly interesting and rather troublesome case is State v. 
Lozano,21 in which an Hispanic Miami police officer killed two black men, 
19 366 U.S. 7117 (1961). See also Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Westray Inquiry), 98 C.C.C. (3d) 20 
(Supreme Court of Canada, 1995): "The objective of finding 12 1urors who know nothing of the facts 
of a highly publicised case is, today, patently unrealistic. Just as clearly, impamality cannot be 
equated with ignorance of all the facts of the case ... [!In order to hold a fair trial it must be possi-
ble to find jurors who, although familiar with the case, are able to discard any previously formed 
opinions and to embark upon their duties armed with both an assumption th,1t the accused is inno-
cent until proven otherwise, and a willingness to determine liability based sokly on the evidence pre-
sented at trial" (per Cory J.). Nevertheless, ABA Standard 8-3.5(b) counsels a judge not to rely 
unduly on a juror's assertion that he or she can sit fairly, and instead to discharge the juror if she has 
been exposed to substantially prejudicial material. 
For an article recommending aggressive use of voir dire, as well as of gag orders on trial partici-
pants, see C.H. Whitebread and D. W. Contreras, "Free Press v. Fa,r Trial: Protecting the Criminal 
Defendant's Rights in a Highly Publicized Trial by Applying the Sheppard-Mu'Min Remedy" (1996) 
69 Southern Ca,fornia Law Review 1587. 
20 Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 10, 440-42. 
21 52 Crim.L.Rep. 1521 (March 24, 1993). 
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sparking off riots. Lozano moved for a change of venue, contending that a 
Miami jury would be afraid to acquit. The motion was denied but his 
manslaughter conviction was reversed on the ground that the venue should have 
been changed. The venue was originally changed to Tallahassee, which has a 
substantial black population but a negligible Hispanic one. Lozano, however, 
won a change to Orlando, which has a small black population but a larger 
Hispanic population than Tallahassee, and there he was acquitted. These cases 
suggest the great care that must be exercised in changing venue. At the same 
time, the venue changes were not required by media reporting as such, or at least 
not by reporting that could plausibly be restrained consistent with any genuine 
notion of a free press. When a governmental office building is bombed, or when 
police beat or kill citizens, these are matters that must receive full reporting. 
Preventing Unfairness: Concern about the Current Trial 
Now consider prejudice that might be created by reporting during trial, or 
immediately beforehand. The principal concern is that the jury will learn of 
information revealed in court but not admitted in evidence. It seems to be 
accepted in England that the press can be restrained from contemporaneously 
reporting such information, even though it is revealed in open court. 22 And it 
does seem to me here that the danger in this situation is far greater than that cre-
ated by pre-trial publicity: now the jurors have been selected, and the legal sys-
tem cannot afford to lose many or sift through a new panel to find jurors who 
have not been tainted; the attention of the jurors is focused fully on the case; and 
there is no lapse of time during which they might ease the situation by forgetting 
what they have heard through the media but not as evidence. Nevertheless, I 
think that censorship of the media is the wrong way to go. In this situation, I 
believe, at least three remedies may help. 
First, courts can insist that, to the extent feasible, all doubtful evidentiary 
issues be presented before trial. Modern notions of procedure seem to be mov-
ing in this direction. Evidentiary questions will always arise during trial, of 
course, but conscientious adherence to this norm would substantially mitigate 
the problem. 
Second, jury sequestration for short periods should be an option.23 Note 
that I refer to short periods. I believe that the sequestration in the O.J. Simpson 
22 For example, 111 Fx /Jarte Telegraph [1993] 2 All E.R. 971, one such restriction was not even 
challenged. 
n ABA Standard 8-.l.6(b) provides that sequestration "should be ordered" whenever "the case 1s 
of such notoriety or the issues are of such a nature that, in the absence of sequestration, there is a 
substantial likelihood that highly prejudicial matters will come to the attention of the jurors." See 
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,363 (1966) ("sequestration of the jury was something the judge 
should have raised sua sponte with counsel"). For a much different view, sec generally M. Strauss, 
"Sequestration" (1996) 24 American Journal of Criminal Law 63 (arguing that the benefits of seques-
tration are largely conjectural, that it is "a concept whose time has come and gone", and that it 
should not be used). 
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criminal case was a terrible burden that should never be repeated. Basing any 
principle on that decision would, in my view, be just one more example of what 
I call the Simpson Elephantiasis Fallacy- that is, the fallacy of believing that any 
representation of the American criminal justice system can be inferred from a 
case that represented an aberrant overgrowth of that system. But sequestration 
for a day or two, and even for periods of up to, say, two weeks, should not be 
too much of a problem; until recently in England, as is still the norm in the 
United States, juries were traditionally sequestered as a matter of course during 
their deliberations - the traditional formula was that they were denied "meat or 
drink" (and outside companionship as well) until they came to a decision24 -
and I believe there is at least as much ground to sequester them during trial, and 
no more hardship for the same amount of time. 
Third, I believe that, especially on request of the defendant, the court should 
consider closing proceedings that are not held in front of the jury, and otherwise 
withholding some information from being presented in open court. I say espe-
cially on request of the defendant because I believe it is essential to an accept-
able form of criminal adjudication that the accused have a right to a public trial. 
This right is expressed in the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The right to openness does not apply to all proceedings, however 
- for example, to grand jury proceedings. The exact bounds of this right are not 
often a matter of controversy. The more frequently pressing issue is what should 
occur when both the prosecution and the defendant wish that some aspect of 
trial or pre-trial proceedings be held out of the public view, even if it is the type 
of proceeding that has traditionally been held in the open. This is a topic of 
enormous importance and complexity. 
The United States Supreme Court, in a series of decisions under the First 
Amendment, has made it very difficult for a court to close proceedings of a type 
that have traditionally been held in the open.25 My personal feeling is that this 
whole doctrine, as a matter of constitutional law, is a mistake. The First 
Amendment protects the right of expression. I do not believe that the 
Amendment should be construed to create a constitutional right of access by out-
siders to the proceedings of governmental institutions. In the long run, I believe, 
extending the First Amendment this far tends to dilute the Amendment and so 
even devalue the rights that it protects, because it turns the doctrine of free 
expression into a balance of policy on the merits of openness. 26 In some settings 
24 See 3 Blackstone's Commentaries 375; Skillern v. State, 559 S. W.2d 828 (Tex. Cr. Apps. 1977); 
A. E. Korpela, Annotation, "Separation of Jury in Criminal Case During Tnal - Modern Cases" 
(1977) 72 A.L.R. 3d 131, § 2(a). For a modern, and more moderate, form of this limitation, see Wash. 
Rev. C. Ann. § 4.44.300. 
25 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (trial); Glohe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (trial testimony of alleged victim of sex offence); Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise/), 464 U.S. 501(1984) (upholding right of access to jury voir 
dire); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (right of access 
to preliminary hearings). 
26 I expressed this view some years ago in "Another Look at Gannett" (1980) 4 District Lawyer 
20. 
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- such as juvenile proceedings,27 grand jury proceedings, jury deliberations, and 
conferences within judicial chambers or among the judges of an appellate court 
- that balance has always been drawn in favour of confidentiality, and no matter 
how great the public interest in what is going on behind those closed doors the 
media do not have a right of access there. The traditional law on this matter 
recently received a strong endorsement as news organisations were denied access 
to proceedings ancillary to the grand jury's investigation in the Lewinsky affair.28 
I do believe that proceedings that have traditionally been open should usually be 
kept open, even if the parties prefer secrecy, but I do not believe that this usual 
preference should be elevated into a constitutional principle. Thus, I find per-
plexing Press Enterprise II, in which the Supreme Court held that the media have 
a constitutional right of access to preliminary hearings, at least as they are con-
ducted in California. I find this a particularly curious case because, as Justice 
Stevens pointed out in dissent, the function of the preliminary hearing is closely 
akin to that of the grand jury, which operates without public access. 
The American Bar Association Standards also reflect the tendency to enshrine 
what has become traditional. Standard 8-3.2 expresses very limited circum-
stances in which a court should "issue a closure order to deny access to the pub-
lic to specified portions of a judicial proceeding or related document or exhibit." 
At the same time, however, the Standard limits the definition of "judicial pro-
ceeding" to exclude "bench conferences or conferences on matters customarily 
conducted in chambers." My suggestion is that, if media coverage of a specific 
procedure - such as a motion to suppress inflammatory evidence - that is not 
conducted in front of the jury substantially threatens the fairness of a trial, 
courts should be willing to take advantage of whatever leeway they are allowed 
under the governing law to conduct the procedure confidentially, such as in 
chambers.29 I do not believe any great sacrifice of principle is entailed, given the 
27 See, for example, N. Y. Family Court Act§ 341.1, providing: "The general public may be 
excluded from any proceeding under this article and only such persons and the representatives of 
authorized agencies as have a direct interest in the case shall be admitted thereto." The Practice 
Commentary by Merril Sobie published with this statute notes that its wording suggests that an 
affirmative act by the court 1s necessary to close the courtroom, but "[i]n practice ... the public is 
routmely excluded from all family court proceedings ... [D]ecades of experience reinforce the vir-
tually automatic exclusion of any person who does nor have a direct mterest in the case." 
28 In re Motums of Doze Jones & Co., Inc., 142 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 1998 WL 
313080 (October 5, 1998). 
2" Interestingly, in some states, when a child witness who is the alleged victim of a crime testifies, 
the court is given authority to clear the courtroom of spectators without a direct interest in the trial 
- except for the media! Sec Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, paras. 115-111; Fla. Stat. Ann. 918.16. Such pro-
visions are plainly not meant to restrict repomng, bur rather to provide an easier environment for 
the child in which to tcst1fy. See People v. Holueck, 141 Ill.2d 84, 152 Ill. Dec. 237,565 N.E.2d 919, 
925-27 (Ill. 1990), upholding one of these statutes against constituti=al attack. An alternative, or 
supplemental, approach, 1s to transmit the child's testimony to another room where spectators may 
see it; in some cases, the defendant is in the room with the spectators rather than with the witness. 
I will not comment here on the merits of such arrangements, which the Supreme Court has held valid 
against constitutional attack in certain circumstances: Maryland v. Craig, 497 ll.S. 836 (1990). See 
also R v. Newcastle upon Tyne Coroner, Ex parte A, The Times, 19 January 1998 (dealing with a 
witness giving evidence behind screens in an inquest). 
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extent to which proceedings already are conducted in camera; in England, the 
presentation of trial evidence is sometimes even presented in camera in matters 
involving very sensitive security information,30 and I am merely suggesting that 
protecting fairness may be another reason for closing the courtroom door occa-
sionally. 
It might seem bizarre at first glance to invoke the possibility of closing pro-
ceedings as a remedy for the potential of prejudicial reporting. Placing restric-
tions on reporting might seem to be a less intrusive remedy than closing the 
proceeding and preventing the flow of information altogether. But I do not 
believe this is true. Withholding information is an everyday practice of many 
governmental institutions - not only those I have mentioned, grand juries, petit 
juries, and conferences among judges and in chambers - but all other policy-
making institutions; indeed, executive privilege, which was very much in the 
news as a result of the Lewinsky affair, is an explicit recognition of the impor-
tance of giving governmental officers breathing room to make some decisions 
behind closed doors. When a particular procedure is closed, all the governmen-
tal institution has done, in effect, is close its own door. On the other hand, cen-
sorship of the media's reporting - whether in the form of before-the-fact 
injunctions against publicising information they have at hand or in the form of 
after-the-fact evaluations of its accuracy and impact - strikes me as much more 
worrisome, requiring the judiciary to punish or threaten punishment of the 
media and creating an excessive entanglement of the two institutions, in which 
the judiciary must determine how the media has performed or may perform its 
job. That, I believe, is bad for courts and bad for the media. The concern, in 
short, is not simply about the degree to which the flow of information is 
restrained but also, and perhaps more importantly, about the procedure by 
which the restraints are determined and effectuated. 
Withholding Names 
One other type of withholding of information, similar to one that is well estab-
lished in England, has fared much better so far in the United States. Recently, 
some state statutes have provided, in effect, that in some circumstances certain 
witnesses, most notably children and the alleged victims of sex offences, can 
have their true names withheld in open court.31 The defendant is given the accu-
,o Courts arc regarded as having inherent power to hold closed proceedings where necessary, in 
exceptional cases. See Scott v. Scott [1913] A.C. 417. 
11 Some appellate courts rout111cly refer to such persons by initials or a fictitious name only. See, 
for example, Womack v. United States, 673 A.2d 603 (D.C. Apps. 1996) (rape complainant); Tyson 
v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Apps. 1993) (rape complainant); State v. Brewer, Tenn. Crim. App. 
LEXIS 476 (Ct. Crim. Apps. 1996), n. 1 (alleged victim of child sexual abuse); State v. Bartlett, 164 
Ariz. 229,230 n.l, 792 P.2d 692,693 n.1 (1990) (policy of court advising all appellate judges "to 
avoid, where possible, rcfernng by name in appellate opinions to individual victims or witnesses 
who arc minors or victims of crimes, where naming them would cause them danger or unnecessary 
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rate identity of the witness - to this he or she has a constitutional right32 - but 
in court the complainant may be referred to by a fictitious name such as Jane 
Doe.33 A California statute to this effect has survived constitutional attack thus 
far,34 and I do not think these statutes are likely to be invalidated. These statutes 
do not generally prevent the release of prejudicial information, but they may 
mitigate the difficulties of testifying for some witnesses in highly publicised 
cases. On balance, I believe these statutes are probably a good thing, though I 
admit to some misgivings. I think they may have an unhealthy tendency to rein-
force social views that there must be something shameful about someone who is 
the complainant in a sex offence case. And, from a totally different perspective, 
there is some value to the idea - one with antecedents in ancient Athens - that a 
witness who testifies falsely risks not only whatever divine or legal punishments 
might be thought to follow from violation of the oath but also loss of reputa-
tion. Nevertheless, in the reality of the modern day, such a modest protection of 
witnesses from the public glare is probably worthwhile, diminishing somewhat 
the already high cost that we impose on witnesses.35 Perhaps this anonymity 
should be extended to other witnesses on a discretionary basis in cases in which 
there is no particular public value in knowing the name of the witness. 
TELEVISING TRIALS 
Discussing media access to trials naturally leads to an issue of constant interest 
on both sides of the Atlantic: should proceedings that are open to the public be 
televised, if broadcasters find them of sufficient interest to carry? Almost all 
American states now allow televising of judicial proceedings in at least some cir-
cumstances, sometimes even over the objection of the defendant. And, though 
televising of proceedings in criminal cases is generally prohibited in federal 
courts,36 the Supreme Court has held the practice constitutional.37 My own feel-
ing is that if a proceeding is to be held in the open, so that any interested person 
who happens to be near the courthouse can, subject to space limitations, walk 
embarrassment"), vacated on other grounds, 501 U.S. 1246 (1991); cf. In re D.C., 281 N.]. Super. 
102,656 A.2d 861 (1995) (committed person, in involuntary civil commitment case); S.V. v. R.V., 
933 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Texas 1996) (divorce case involving allegations of sexual abuse); G.W.H. v. 
D.A.H., 650 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Apps. 1983) (pursuant to statute, now Family Code§ 109.002, only 
using initials in case involving termination of parent-child relationship). 
12 Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968). 
33 See California Penal Code§ 293.5. Somewhat similar is Florida Stat. Ann.§ 92.56 (added 1995). 
34 People v. Ramirez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9, 55 Cal. App.4th 47 (Cal. Apps. 1997), review denied. 
35 See J. D. Jackson, R. Kilpatrick and C. Harvey, Called to Court: A Public Review of Criminal 
Justice m Northern Ireland (1991, Belfast: SLS) 132 (noting anxiety of some witnesses about public-
ity for their testimony). 
36 Fcd.R.Cnm. P. 53. But note that even in federal courts there has been some experiment, and 
some loosening, as described by J. Abramson in "The Pros and Cons of Televismg Trials", in 
J. Abramson (ed.), Postmortem: The 0. ]. Simpson Case Confronts Race, Domestic Violence, 
Lawyers, Money and the Law (1996, New York: Basic Books), 195, 196-197. 
37 Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). 
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into the courthouse and watch and listen, and so that the media can inform at 
second hand those who cannot attend, there generally is no good reason to pre-
vent television cameras from enabling those who cannot attend to watch at first 
hand. In states that have extensive experience with televised proceedings, there 
seems to be very little disposition to end the practice.38 
I do not want to claim too much for televising of proceedings. Advocates 
often contend that televising trials performs a valuable educational function by 
showing the public how trials work, without the filter of reporters. To some 
extent that is true, but the point should not be carried too far. For one thing, it 
is the extraordinary trials that tend to be televised. And, though Court TV, a 
cable channel in the United States that specialises in coverage of legal proceed-
ings, is driven - at least in part by the limited supply of truly extraordinary tri-
als - to cover some more mundane ones, it is still the extraordinary ones that get 
the most attention. Trials can be of extraordinary interest to the public for var-
ious reasons, but usually one aspect of the extraordinary case is that the advo-
cacy is better - with the expenditure of a great deal more energy and resources, 
and often with better lawyers - than in the typical criminal case. The Simpson 
and Louise Woodward cases exemplify this phenomenon. Accordingly, viewers 
see only a small, atypical slice of the criminal justice system at work, one that is 
in many ways far less distressing than the mundane mill of ordinary cases, plea 
bargained or tried relatively perfunctorily by comparison because of lack of 
resources. In short, much of what is learned from watching trials on television 
is misinformation about the broader system. Also, unless a viewer watches all 
or virtually all of a trial - and, putting aside retired people, if many viewers do 
that we are wasting too much of our gross national product on televised trials -
it is not true that he or she is no longer dependent on reporters as intermediaries. 
Most viewers are not able to watch more than snippets live, and beyond that 
they depend on editors to make selections of what to show. 
Nevertheless, I believe that television is a way of bringing the norm of open 
trials into the modern day. Great trials have for millennia - dating back at least 
to those of Socrates and Jesus - been held in view of the relevant community, 
and if the relevant community is far more than the number of people who can 
crowd into a courtroom, television is an appropriate solution. 
Fears that television cameras would be too much of a distraction in the court-
room are no longer well founded, now that technology and improved tech-
niques allow the technicians to be unobtrusive. The conduct of participants 
once in the courtroom seems from numerous studies to be very little altered by 
the presence of cameras.39 I do not believe that most lawyers play to the cam-
38 Televising the Courts, a 1989 report of a working party of the Public Affairs Committee of the 
General Council of the Bar of England, recommended that televising of trtals he permitted, but as 
yet this has not happened. 
19 See, for example, K. L. Sager and K. N. Frederiksen, "Televising the Judicial Branch: In 
Furtherance of the Public's First Amendment Rights" (1996) 69 Southern Caifornia Law Review 
1519, 1543-1548 (views of two media advocates); S. E. Harding, Note, "Cameras and the Need for 
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eras. Even if a large part of their concern is their public reputation, they know 
that the best way to protect that reputation is to win the case being tried. Thus, 
I believe, from what I have seen both in the courtroom and on the screen, that 
they generally stay focused on what is happening in the courtroom. Again, I do 
not want to overdraw the point; for example, I suspect that the trial judge in the 
Louise Woodward case would not have given her such a low sentence had the 
trial not generated such a strong public reaction.40 
After the 0. J. Simpson criminal trial, there was much talk that the televising 
of the proceedings was responsible in large measure for the length of the trial. I 
do not believe this is so. The Simpson trial was bound to be an aberrational 
event whether or not it was televised. If the trial judge had been inclined to keep 
a tighter rein on the proceedings, the television cameras would not have stopped 
him. A more serious issue is whether televising a spectacular trial will increase 
disrespect for the judicial system or, when the case is racially charged, inflame 
racial tensions. My own view is that there is no way to hide these problems per-
manently. If problems lurking beneath the surface are brought out into the 
open, that is probably good on net. 
Televising a trial will often inflate interest in the trial; I believe this is one rea-
son why the Louise Woodward case became such a cause celebre in the United 
Kingdom. That is not an altogether bad phenomenon - real trials are not a bad 
thing for the attention of the public to be focused on, at least in comparison to 
a lot of what they might otherwise be watching on television. I am not terribly 
worried about television intensifying the jury's fear of a mob reaction to an 
unpopular verdict; this is a concern that has been present in some cases long 
before the advent of television, and I think the concern is more intense when an 
inflamed crowd is actually in and around the courtroom - "a mob savagely and 
manifestly intent on a single result," as Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., put 
it in one notorious case in the United States.41 
One keen observer, Peter Aranella, who gained a good deal of celebrity as a 
result of the Simpson case, has suggested that one reason not to televise some 
notorious trials is that the lawyers, anticipating the possibility of a retrial, will 
try to reach and indoctrinate future jurors - whose attention has been drawn by 
the telecast of the.: first trial- from the courthouse steps.42 Television may aggra-
vate this problem, but of course it exists even without telecasts. And indeed, the 
problem seems less serious to me - because a second trial is so speculative and 
Unrestricted Electronic Media Access to Federal Courtrooms" (1996) 69 Southern Cdifornia Lau, 
Review 827. 
40 The judge began his decision on the post-trial motions by emphasising that we do not do jus-
tice by plebiscite. In reducing sentence, however, he referred to the case as an extraordinary one. But 
what made 1t extraord111:1ry - apart from the quality of the advocacy and the extent of public inter-
est? 
41 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,349 (1915) (dissenting). This important case has been the sub-
ject of a great deal of literature. See, for example, L. Dinnerstein, The Leo Frank Case (1968, New 
York: Columbia University Press). 
42 P. Aranclla, "Foreword: O.J. Lessons" (1996) 69 Southern Califorma Law Rez,iew 1233, 1256. 
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distant - than the basic problem of lawyers attempting to win over potential 
jurors for the first trial by making public statements about the evidence before 
the jury is selected. The remedy, if one is needed, is probably to restrain the 
lawyers from making such statements. 
RESTRAINTS ON PARTICIPANTS IN THE SYSTEM 
Restraints on lawyers, or gag orders, are the most important species of the other 
type of restraints I will discuss, though very briefly-restraints on those who par-
ticipate in the trial process, as opposed to merely report on it. To the extent we 
are talking about information that a party or attorney receives only through the 
compulsory processes of the litigation system, then there is no constitutional bar 
against an order preventing public disclosure.43 I believe American courts could 
be more aggressive than they have been about preventing disclosure in this con-
text. The tougher question concerns other information. Does the fact that a per-
son plays some role in the case- attorney, party, witness, in particular - justify 
restraints on disclosing information relevant to the case? 
Consider first the principal issue - the extent to which attorneys may be 
restrained. These restraints are a matter of course in England. In the United 
States they are more controversial. The American Bar Association's Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct 3.6, which a substantial number of states have adopted, 
prohibits a lawyer from making an extra-judicial statement if he or she should 
know "that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 
adjudicative proceeding."44 But in a highly publicised case, in which the defen-
dant has a reputation and perhaps a political career to protect, it seems the 
attorney should be able to make some sort of explanatory statement. The Model 
Rules standard, as part of what is known as its "safe harbor" provision, allows 
the defence lawyer to state the general nature of the defence. But is this enough? 
Sometimes, the issues raised by litigation are of general public importance, and 
discussion of them is what we call "classic political speech". The Supreme Court 
has confronted this issue, in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,45 with a notably 
mixed result. By a 5--4 vote, the Court held that the basic prohibition did not 
violate the attorney's right of free speech. But a different 5--4 majority, with 
Justice O'Connor providing the swing vote, held that, if the statement by the 
attorney there - one highly critical of the official conduct of the case - was not 
covered by the "safe harbor" provision, then it was void as vague. I will say no 
more than that I, like the Court, find the issue very difficult. 
So too is the issue of the "Son of Sam" laws46 - the question of whether a state 
may confiscate the profits made by defendants from books and other media 
43 See Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
44 The ABA's Standard 8-1.1 includes the same language. 
45 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
46 These laws are named after a notorious serial murderer in New York who referred to himself 
as "Son of Sam" in the notes he wrote while still at large taking credit for the murders. 
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exploitation of their crimes. In one case,47 the Court invalidated such a law; the 
law imposed a penalty on no other speech and no other income, said the Court. 
It is possible, though, that a different type of law, one more broadly geared to 
depriving the defendant of the fruits of the crime, would survive. 48 Appealing as 
this idea may be, a law geared to depriving the criminal of expressive fruits of 
the crime creates many difficulties. For example, if a notable person with a raff-
ish past writes a memoir, does such a law require a determination of how much 
of the royalties are dependent on the author's narration of illegal activity?49 
Perhaps the best approach is not to depend on confiscation, but rather to facili-
tate the ability of crime victims and their families to recover damages in civil lit-
igation. For example, the limitations period might be re-opened if the defendant 
makes any income, including royalties, attributable to the crime. 
More unusual than the "Son of Sam" laws is a statue passed by California, 
making it a crime for a person to receive any benefit or payment for providing 
information about what he or she should reasonably know is a crime or where 
he or she should reasonably know that he or she may be called as a witness in a 
criminal prosecution.50 This statue has been held unconstitutional by a lower 
court,51 and I doubt it would survive in the higher courts. Once again, it is easy 
enough to see the appeal of a restriction like this.52 But it creates a serious 
impediment on the flow of information that might be of great public interest and 
importance - information that its possessor has not gained by virtue of involve-
ment in the judicial system or by use of its mechanisms. 
One other type of participant who might want to talk is the juror - and here 
I believe that section 8 of the English Contempt of Court Act makes a great mis-
take by prohibiting interviews with jurors. Such interviews are very valuable, 
whether the case is a highly publicised one or merely workaday, in giving a win-
dow into the jury room - so long as the jurors speak voluntarily. 
47 Smum ◊" Schustn 1'. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 
(1991). 
48 See gencr,1lly L. K. Zavack, Note, "Can States Enact Constitutional 'Son of Sam' Laws After 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. 1'. New York State Crime Victims Board?" (1993) 37 St. Louis Uniuersity 
Law journal 70 l. 
49 Cf. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. 105 (1991), 123. 
so Cal. Penal Code § Ll2.5. 
SI Californra First Amendment Coalition v. Lungren, 1995 U.S. 01st. LEXIS 11655, 1995 WL 
482066 (N.D. Cal 1995); see also M. Strauss, "From Waness to Riches: The Constitutionality of 
Restricting Witness ~peecl1" ( 1996) 38 Arrzona Law Review 291; J. R. Cady, "Bouncing 'Check hook 
Journalism': A Balance Between the First and Sixth Amendments in High-Profile Criminal Cases" 
(1995) 4 Willram & Mary Rrll of Rights Journal 671; I. Cuhell, Note, "Banning the Sale of Witness 
Testimony: A First Amendment Challenge to California Penal Code Secnon 132.5" (1995) 75 Boston 
University Law Review 1135. 
'
2 In England, the Court of Appeal has spoken critically about media payments to witnesses, indi-
cating that in some cases they may put justice at risk, and suggesting that the question of whether 
they should be prohibacd or controlled by legislation should be examined, sec R u. West ( 1996) 2 
Cr.App.R. 374, 389. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the United States, it seems to us that in the United Kingdom too little weight 
is put on free speech. I think that to most people in the United Kingdom, it seems 
that we in the United States are too willing to tolerate free speech at the cost of 
creating more complexity, delay, cost, and a circus atmosphere. Neither side 
seems disposed to move in the direction of the other; this is a context in which 
path dependence is very important. And I am reasonably confident that in the 
short term neither side will move very far in the direction I have advocated- that 
rather than infringe free speech, courts should be more willing to close some 
aspects of proceedings. But in the long run, the sacrifice of some openness in 
order to ease the tension between fairness and free expression may prove to be 
a very worthwhile bargain. 
